Soft landing in a Markov-switching economy
We analyse the monetary policy implications of boom-bust cycles in asset prices using a Markov-switching rational expectations model. In our simulations, when a bubble bursts, the Taylor rule fails to achieve a soft landing, contrary to the optimal policy.
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