Bundling, information aggregation and entry deterrence
This paper provides an explanation for bundling based on its information aggregation effect. Using bundling, the monopolist can hide the information of each monopoly market by aggregating information. We show that the monopolist chooses bundling in an early period because bundling removes potential competition in the following period.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barry Nalebuff, 2004. "Bundling as an Entry Barrier," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(1), pages 159-187, February.
- Adams, William James & Yellen, Janet L, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-98, August.
- Michael D. Whinston, 1989.
"Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion,"
NBER Working Papers
2995, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:2:p:100-102. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.