Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games
We give a mechanism fully implementing envy-free divisions such that: strategy spaces are symmetric, the set of Nash equilibria is a global attractor for the best-reply dynamics. As a byproduct, undesired mixed-strategy equilibria are weeded out by the adjustment process.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Andrew Postlewaite & David Wettstein, 1989. "Feasible and Continuous Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 603-611.
- Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000.
"Implementation, Elimination Of Weakly Dominated Strategies And Evolutionary Dynamics,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
2000-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April.
- Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 1997. "Implementation, elimination of weakly dominated strategies and evolutionary dynamics," Economics Working Papers 221, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, . "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolotionary Dynamics," ELSE working papers 057, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- repec:fth:calaec:6-98 is not listed on IDEAS
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996.
"Toward Natural Implementation,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-80, November.
- Galbiati, Marco, 2008.
"Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games,"
Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 72-75, July.
- Marco Galbiati, 2006. "Fair Divisions as Attracting Nash Equilibria of Simple Games," Economics Working Papers ECO2006/24, European University Institute.
- Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993.
"An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication,"
93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sobel, Joel, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1181-93, September.
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002.
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288
- Antonio Cabrales, .
"Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information,"
ELSE working papers
009, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Cabrales, Antonio, 1999. "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 159-184, June.
- Antonio Cabrales, 1996. "Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information," Economics Working Papers 179, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999. "Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 271-293, August.
- Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:72-75. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.