Analyzing economic market interactions as conflicts: New concepts to assess market-based policy instruments
Complementing market-based policy instruments with conflict analysis approaches provides a wider understanding of market situations and allows to identify minimal requirements regarding needs, power and conflict dynamics. If these are not met, a market cannot be successfully introduced or a liberalization process implemented. Conflict analysis offers a language better suited to the concerns of people negatively affected by new markets. Applying this language helps to counterbalance the predominance of economic concepts. This fosters mutual understanding and enhances the prospect for successful implementation of market-based policies. We illustrate the potential of conflict analysis with examples from water privatization and labeling.
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- Kanbur, Ravi, 2001. "Obnoxious Markets," Working Papers 127655, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
- Perry, C. J. & Rock, M. & Seckler, D., 1997. "Water as an economic good: a solution, or a problem ?," IWMI Research Reports H021492, International Water Management Institute.
- Shleifer, Andrei, 2004.
"Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?,"
27867243, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Rothschild, Kurt W., 2002. "The absence of power in contemporary economic theory," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 433-442.
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