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On innovation cycles in a finite discrete R&D game

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  • Luckraz, Shravan

Abstract

This paper shows that innovation (or Schumpeter's) cycles can be demonstrated in a discrete and finite dynamic game of innovation and imitation. We find that the cycles depend crucially on whether imitation is a credible threat and hence, we conclude that strategic interactions are sufficient to generate cycles in an innovation game.

Suggested Citation

  • Luckraz, Shravan, 2013. "On innovation cycles in a finite discrete R&D game," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 510-513.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:30:y:2013:i:c:p:510-513
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2012.11.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1990. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 641-642, June.
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    6. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-1306, December.
    7. Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1981. "Dynamic games of innovation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 21-41, August.
    8. Tramontana, Fabio, 2010. "Heterogeneous duopoly with isoelastic demand function," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 350-357, January.
    9. Josef Hofbauer & Karl H. Schlag, 2000. "Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 10(5), pages 523-543.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Congcong & Chen, Shanshan & Wang, Yuhan & Pansera, Bruno Antonio & Luckraz, Shravan, 2023. "On the welfare and policy implications of a two-period real option game," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    2. Goel, Rajeev K. & Saunoris, James W., 2016. "Institutional path dependence and international research intensity," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PB), pages 851-858.
    3. Yap, Yee Jiun & Luckraz, Shravan & Tey, Siew Kian, 2014. "Long-term research and development incentives in a dynamic Cournot duopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 8-18.
    4. Hamid Beladi & Xiao Luo & Reza Oladi, 2024. "Market networks: the core," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 485-498, November.
    5. Inga Ivanova & Oivind Strand & Loet Leydesdorff, 2019. "The Synergy and Cycle Values in Regional Innovation Systems: The Case of Norway," Foresight and STI Governance, National Research University Higher School of Economics, vol. 13(1), pages 48-61.

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