Inferring strategies from observed actions: a nonparametric, binary tree classification approach
This paper introduces a nonparametric binary classification tree approach to inferring unobserved strategies from the observed actions of economic agents. The strategies are in the form of possibly nested if- then statements. We apply our approach to experimental data from the repeated ultimatum game, which was conducted in four different countries by Roth et al. (1991). We find that strategy inference is consistent with existing inference, provides new explanations for subject behavior, and provides new empirically--based hypotheses regarding ultimatum game strategies. We conclude that strategy inference is potentially useful as a complementary method of statistical inference in applied research.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991.
"Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December.
- Alvin E. Roth & V. Prasnikar & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & S. Zamir, 1998. "Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 344, David K. Levine.
- John Duffy & Jim Warnick, 1999. "Using Symbolic Regression to Infer Strategies from Experimental Data," Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 1033, Society for Computational Economics.
- Bruce E. Hansen, 2000.
"Sample Splitting and Threshold Estimation,"
Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 575-604, May.
- Cooper, Suzanne J, 1998. "Multiple Regimes in U.S. Output Fluctuations," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 16(1), pages 92-100, January.
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Robert L. Slonim, 2001.
"Inferring Repeated Game Strategies From Actions: Evidence From Trust Game Experiments,"
2001-W13, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Robert Slonim, 2006. "Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(3), pages 603-632, 08.
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Bradley Ruffle, 2006. "The Strategies Behind Their Actions: A Method To Infer Repeated-Game Strategies And An Application To Buyer Behavior," Departmental Working Papers 2005-04, McGill University, Department of Economics.
- John Duffy and Jim Engle-Warnick, 2001.
"Multiple Regimes in U.S. Monetary Policy? A Nonparametric Approach,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 2001
151, Society for Computational Economics.
- Duffy, John & Engle-Warnick, Jim, 2006. "Multiple Regimes in U.S. Monetary Policy? A Nonparametric Approach," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(5), pages 1363-1377, August.
- Durlauf, Steven N & Johnson, Paul A, 1995.
"Multiple Regimes and Cross-Country Growth Behaviour,"
Journal of Applied Econometrics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(4), pages 365-84, Oct.-Dec..
- Durlauf, S.M. & Johnson, P.A., 1995. "Multiple Regimes and Cross-Country Growth Behavior," Working papers 9419r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Durlauf, S.N. & Johnson, P.A., 1994. "Multiple Regimes and Cross-Country Growth Behavior," Working papers 9419, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:27:y:2003:i:11-12:p:2151-2170. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.