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Bribery, inefficiency, and bureaucratic delay

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  • Ahlin, Christian
  • Bose, Pinaki

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  • Ahlin, Christian & Bose, Pinaki, 2007. "Bribery, inefficiency, and bureaucratic delay," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 465-486, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:84:y:2007:i:1:p:465-486
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June.
    2. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2005. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 9-32, Winter.
    3. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1987. "Asymmetric information in competitive bribery games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 153-156.
    4. Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "Government in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 385-410, April.
    5. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993. "Corruption," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 599-617.
    6. Banerjee, A.V., 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," Working papers 97-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    7. Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2004. "The Economics of Repeated Extortion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 203-223, Summer.
    8. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1990. "Corruption and allocation efficiency," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 153-164, July.
    9. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    10. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
    11. Berkowitz, Daniel & Li, Wei, 2000. "Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 369-397, June.
    12. Guriev, Sergei, 2004. "Red tape and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 489-504, April.
    13. Thierry Verdier & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March.
    14. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December.
    15. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1986. "A note on competitive bribery games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 337-341.
    16. Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2003. "The dynamics of corruption with the ratchet effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 427-443, March.
    17. Beck, Paul J. & Maher, Michael W., 1986. "A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-5.
    18. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-1023, October.
    19. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332.
    20. Clark, Derek J. & Riis, Christian, 2000. "Allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 109-124, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Baksi, Soham & Bose, Pinaki & Pandey, Manish, 2009. "The impact of liberalization on bureaucratic corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 214-224, October.
    2. Davide Infante & Janna Smirnova, 2010. "Market Failures within Poor Institutions: The Effects of Bureaucrats’ Rent-seeking Activity," Chapters,in: Institutional and Social Dynamics of Growth and Distribution, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Rodrigues-Neto, José A., 2014. "On corruption, bribes and the exchange of favors," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 152-162.
    4. Drugov, Mikhail, 2010. "Competition in bureaucracy and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 107-114, July.
    5. Dutta, Nabamita & Kar, Saibal & Roy, Sanjukta, 2013. "Corruption and persistent informality: An empirical investigation for India," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 357-373.
    6. Arvind K. Jain, 2011. "Corruption: Theory, Evidence and Policy," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(2), pages 3-9, 07.
    7. Dimant, Eugen, 2014. "The Antecedents and Effects of Corruption - A Reassessment of Current (Empirical) Findings," MPRA Paper 60947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Rajeev K. Goel, 2013. "Initiation of corrupt exchanges and severity of corruption," Financial Theory and Practice, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 37(2), pages 207-222.
    9. repec:ces:ifodic:v:9:y:2011:i:2:p:16132588 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Djankov, Simeon, 2008. "The Regulation of Entry: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 7080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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