ESO compensation: The roles of default risk, employee sentiment, and insider information
This paper derives a pricing model for employee stock options (ESO) that includes default risk and considers employee sentiment. Using ESO data from 1992 to 2004, the study finds that the average executive's subjective value is about 55% of the Black-Scholes value. Only employees who over-estimate firm returns (or insiders who know that the firm is under-valued) by about 10% per annum will prefer ESOs over cash compensation. Our model also shows that work incentives offered by ESOs may be far lower than those implied by Black-Scholes but that ESOs may induce less risk-taking behavior, contrary to typical moral hazard arguments. Findings may impact relevant accounting regulations as well as compensation decisions.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Holland, Larry C. & Elder, Erick M., 2006. "Employee stock options in compensation agreements: A financing explanation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 367-379, January.
- Nohel, Tom & Todd, Steven, 2005. "Compensation for managers with career concerns: the role of stock options in optimal contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 229-251, March.
- Huddart, Steven, 1994. "Employee stock options," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 207-231, September.
- Ryan, Harley Jr. & Wiggins, Roy III, 2001. "The influence of firm- and manager-specific characteristics on the structure of executive compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 101-123, June.
- Huddart, Steven & Lang, Mark, 1996. "Employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 5-43, February.
- Jin, Li, 2002. "CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 29-63, October.
- Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1978. "Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1429-45, November.
- Gregory R. Duffee, 1996.
"Estimating the price of default risk,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
96-29, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Nittai K. Bergman & Dirk Jenter, 2005.
"Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation,"
NBER Working Papers
11409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2000.
"Stock Options for Undiversified Executives,"
NBER Working Papers
8052, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1997.
"Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?,"
NBER Working Papers
6213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hull, John & White, Alan, 1995. "The impact of default risk on the prices of options and other derivative securities," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 299-322, May.
- Menachem Brenner & Rafi Eldor & Shmuel Hauser, 1999.
"The Price of Options Illiquidity,"
New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires
99-086, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
- William N. Goetzmann & Alok Kumar, 2005. "Why Do Individual Investors Hold Under-Diversified Portfolios?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm454, Yale School of Management.
- Cox, John C. & Ross, Stephen A. & Rubinstein, Mark, 1979. "Option pricing: A simplified approach," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 229-263, September.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Pukthuanthong, Kuntara & Roll, Richard & Walker, Thomas, 2007. "How employee stock options and executive equity ownership affect long-term IPO operating performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 695-720, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:14:y:2008:i:5:p:630-641. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.