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Paper millionaires: How valuable is stock to a stockholder who is restricted from selling it?

  • Matthias Kahl
  • Jun Liu
  • Francis A. Longstaff

Many firms have stockholders who face severe restrictions on their ability to sell their shares and diversify the risk of their personal wealth. We study the costs of these liquidity restrictions on stockholders using a continuous-time portfolio choice framework. These restrictions have major effects on the optimal investment and consumption strategies because of the need to hedge the illiquid stock position and smooth consumption in anticipation of the eventual lapse of the restrictions. These results provide a number of important insights about the effects of illiquidity in financial markets.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w8969.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 8969.

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Date of creation: May 2002
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Publication status: published as Kahl, Matthias, Jun Liu, and Francis A. Longstaff. "Paper Millionaires: How Valuable is Stock to a Stockholder Who is Restricted from Selling it?" The Journal of Financial Economics 67 (2003): 385-410.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8969
Note: AP
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