Why privatize or why not? Empirical evidence from China's SOEs reform
Using a firm-level panel dataset which covers over 50,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across China for the years 1998 to 2003, we attempt to answer the question of why some SOEs are privatized while others remain under state control. By applying a Heckman two-stage procedure, we investigate the causes that determine SOE privatization outcome. We find that the factors most conducive for privatization are the rise of competition, the increase of FDI concentration of both industries and provinces, and the hardening of SOEs' budget constraints. Moreover, it is shown that relatively better performing SOEs, measured by per employee value-added, profitability, and export propensity, are more prone to privatization. However, we should be careful in interpreting this result, due to the problem of selection bias. Results of the first-stage selection equation suggest that many small and non-performing SOEs dropped out of the sample, possibility due to privatization. What we can conclude is that, among the remainders, the better performing SOEs are more likely to be privatized.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dougherty, Sean & Herd, Richard & He, Ping, 2007. "Has a private sector emerged in China's industry? Evidence from a quarter of a million Chinese firms," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 309-334.
- Poncet, Sandra, 2003. "Measuring Chinese domestic and international integration," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-21.
- Loren Brandt & Hongbin Li & Joanne Roberts, 2005. "Banks and Enterprise Privatization in China," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 524-546, October.
- Yuanzheng Cao & Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997.
"From Federalism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style,"
97049, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Yuanzheng Cao & Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1999. "From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 7(1), pages 103-131, March.
- Cao Yuanzheng, & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry, 1998. "From Federalism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style," CEPR Discussion Papers 1838, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yuanzheng Cao & Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese style," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 126, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Nandini Gupta & John C. Ham & Jan Svejnar, 2000.
"Priorities and Sequencing in Privatization: Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
323, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Nandini Gupta & John Ham & Jan Svejnar, 2000. "Priorities and Sequencing in Privatization: Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1580, Econometric Society.
- Alwyn Young, 2000. "The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China," NBER Working Papers 7828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Imai, Ken'ichi, 2006. "Explaining the Persistence of State-ownership in China," IDE Discussion Papers 64, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
- Guoqiang Tian, 2001. "A Theory of Ownership Arrangements and Smooth Transition," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(3), pages 380-380, September.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
- Alwyn Young, 2000. "The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1091-1135.
- Li, Shaomin & Li, Shuhe & Zhang, Weiying, 2000. "The Road to Capitalism: Competition and Institutional Change in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 269-292, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:20:y:2009:i:3:p:402-413. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.