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Measuring the ownership and control of UK listed firms: Some methodological challenges

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  • Goergen, Marc
  • Mira, Svetlana

Abstract

While scholars in business, management, accounting and finance frequently use data on the ownership and control structure of companies in their research, we show that determining this structure for a UK public limited company using publicly available information can be fraught with a number of difficulties. The latest changes to the UK Listing rules following the Hill Review (2021) may further exacerbate these difficulties via the potential increase in listed companies with dual-class shares. With the help of case studies and further empirical work, we demonstrate some of the methodological challenges faced by researchers. We provide guidance on how to tackle these challenges.

Suggested Citation

  • Goergen, Marc & Mira, Svetlana, 2023. "Measuring the ownership and control of UK listed firms: Some methodological challenges," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:bracre:v:55:y:2023:i:6:s0890838923001294
    DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2023.101272
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gilmour, Paul & Pandey, Durgesh & Goldbarsht, Doron, 2025. "Registers of beneficial owners based on blockchain technology: Implications for the accounting profession," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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