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Governance Mechanisms and Buyer Supplier Relationship:Static and Dynamic Panel Data Evidence from Tunisian Exporting SMEs

Author

Listed:
  • Bellouma Meryem

    (Faculty of Economics and Management of Nabeul, Tunisia)

Abstract

This study seeks to understand the effect of transactional and relational governance mechanisms on opportunism induced by the buyer supplier relationship. Using panel data of 386 Tunisian export companies between 2003 and 2008, the analysis shows that transactional as well as relational governance mechanisms are negatively related to the opportunistic behavior of the customer. In order to focus on internal corporate characteristics, the level of debt and the size of the buyer are controlled. This study supports the role of contracts as formal governance tool in reducing inter-firm opportunism which corroborates transaction cost economics. It also confirms some main notions in social exchange theory. The role of trust as relational mechanism in governing the buyer-supplier relationship has been verified. Finally, the findings of this paper sustain the complementarity view toward relational and transactional governance mechanisms. The paper offers insights to executives of companies to govern the buyer-supplier relationship in order to dispel opportunism by using simultaneously transactional and relational mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Bellouma Meryem, 2011. "Governance Mechanisms and Buyer Supplier Relationship:Static and Dynamic Panel Data Evidence from Tunisian Exporting SMEs," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 1(3), pages 88-98, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eco:journ1:2011-03-2
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yadong Luo, 2007. "An integrated anti-opportunism system in international exchange," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 38(6), pages 855-877, November.
    2. Liu, Yi & Li, Yuan & Zhang, Leinan, 2010. "Control mechanisms across a buyer-supplier relationship quality matrix," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 3-12, January.
    3. Mian, Shehzad L & Smith, Clifford W, Jr, 1992. " Accounts Receivable Management Policy: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 169-200, March.
    4. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    5. Meryem Bellouma & Abdelwahed Omri & Sami Bennaceur, 2009. "The impact of lending relationship on risk premium and credit availability: evidence from Tunisia," Afro-Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(3), pages 235-250.
    6. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2002. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 32-53, February.
    7. Marc Deloof, 2003. "Does Working Capital Management Affect Profitability of Belgian Firms?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3-4), pages 573-588.
    8. Bougheas, Spiros & Mateut, Simona & Mizen, Paul, 2009. "Corporate trade credit and inventories: New evidence of a trade-off from accounts payable and receivable," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 300-307, February.
    9. Jain, Neelam, 2001. "Monitoring costs and trade credit," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 89-110.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance; Transactional governance mechanisms; Relational governance mechanisms; Opportunism; Buyer supplier relationship.;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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