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Patent Licensing in a Mixed Oligopoly with a Foreign Firm

Author

Listed:
  • Guangliang Ye

    () (Hanqing Advanced Institunte of Economics and Fiance, School of Economics, Renmin University of China)

Abstract

This paper investigates optimal licensing in a mixed oligopoly with a foreign firm. It is the first to compare licensing by means of a fixed fee and by means of a royalty when the innovator is a public firm. In contrast to a private oligopoly, we show that license via a fixed fee is superior to license via a royalty for the innovator.

Suggested Citation

  • Guangliang Ye, 2012. "Patent Licensing in a Mixed Oligopoly with a Foreign Firm," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1191-1197.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00682
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2012/Volume32/EB-12-V32-I2-P113.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John S. Heywood & Guangliang Ye, 2011. "Patent licensing in a model of spatial price discrimination," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 90(3), pages 589-602, August.
    2. Sougata Poddar & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2004. "On Patent Licensing in Spatial Competition," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 80(249), pages 208-218, June.
    3. Wang, X. Henry, 1998. "Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-62, July.
    4. Luigi Filippini, 2005. "Licensing Contract In A Stackelberg Model," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 73(5), pages 582-598, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gelves, Juan Alejandro & Heywood, John S., 2016. "How does a mixed ownership firm license a patent?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 278-284.
    2. Shuai Niu, 2015. "Privatization in the presence of patent licensing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 116(2), pages 151-163, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mixed Oligopoly; Licensing; Royalty;

    JEL classification:

    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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