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Do procedures matter in fairness allocations? Experimental evidence in mixed gender pairings

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  • Utteeyo Dasgupta

    () (Franklin and Marshall College)

Abstract

Does the procedure of entitlement affect fairness perceptions? We use a dictator game to study the question in mixed gender pairs. In our experiments, we vary the process of entitlement across treatments. Allocators in our dictator game can inherit an amount without any effort, earn an amount with effort, or inherit an amount earned by a randomly matched partner's effort. We find subjects allocate lower amounts to their paired partners when they are dividing an amount that has been earned through their own effort and allocate relatively higher amounts when dividing an amount that has been earned through the paired member's real effort. Results also suggest that female proposers are more sensitive towards variations in entitlement processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Utteeyo Dasgupta, 2011. "Do procedures matter in fairness allocations? Experimental evidence in mixed gender pairings," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 820-829.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00088
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2011/Volume31/EB-11-V31-I1-P79.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "The relative price of fairness: gender differences in a punishment game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 143-158, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Utteeyo Dasgupta & Lata Gangadharan & Pushkar Maitra & Subha Mani & Samyukta Subramanian, 2012. "Choosing to be Trained: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Monash Economics Working Papers 43-12, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    2. Tobias Cagala & Ulrich Glogowsky & Veronika Grimm & Johannes Rincke, 2017. "Public Goods Provision with Rent-Extracting Administrators," CESifo Working Paper Series 6801, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. repec:kap:expeco:v:20:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-017-9516-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Utteeyo Dasgupta & Subha Mani, 2013. "Only Mine or All Ours: An Artefactual Field Experiment on Procedural Altruism," Fordham Economics Discussion Paper Series dp2013-01, Fordham University, Department of Economics.
    5. Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Gangadharan, Lata & Maitra, Pushkar & Mani, Subha & Subramanian, Samyukta, 2015. "Choosing to be trained: Do behavioral traits matter?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 145-159.
    6. Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Mani, Subha, 2015. "Only Mine or All Ours: Do Stronger Entitlements Affect Altruistic Choices in the Household," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 363-375.
    7. Dold, Malte & Khadjavi, Menusch, 2017. "Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 127-137.
    8. Sharma, Smriti, 2015. "Gender and distributional preferences: Experimental evidence from India," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 113-123.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Procedural justice; Gender; Dictator game.;

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics

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