Do procedures matter in fairness allocations? Experimental evidence in mixed gender pairings
Does the procedure of entitlement affect fairness perceptions? We use a dictator game to study the question in mixed gender pairs. In our experiments, we vary the process of entitlement across treatments. Allocators in our dictator game can inherit an amount without any effort, earn an amount with effort, or inherit an amount earned by a randomly matched partner's effort. We find subjects allocate lower amounts to their paired partners when they are dividing an amount that has been earned through their own effort and allocate relatively higher amounts when dividing an amount that has been earned through the paired member's real effort. Results also suggest that female proposers are more sensitive towards variations in entitlement processes.
Volume (Year): 31 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "The relative price of fairness: gender differences in a punishment game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 143-158, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00088. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.