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Tactical transfers in a federal institutional setting

Author

Listed:
  • Gabriele Guggiola

    (University of Insubria)

Abstract

One of the main aim of political economy is to understand how income redistribution is determined. In the paper tactical redistribution, through which parties aim at maximizing the share of votes obtained in an election, is analyzed in a federal institutional setting, where different levels of government coexist. Dixit and Londregan (1996)'s model is taken as a starting point; their model is extended in order to allow the analysis of the interactions between the various government levels. Four institutional settings are considered, entailing different rules and a different degree of decentralization in the policy and transfer determination process: fully localized and fully centralized governments, federal government with transfers among regions and federal government with transfers among social groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriele Guggiola, 2011. "Tactical transfers in a federal institutional setting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(3), pages 2098-2108.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00087
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, Roger B., 1993. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(4), pages 856-869, December.
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    3. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
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    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues

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