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Strategic Trade Policy in Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Competition

  • Leonard F. S. Wang

    ()

    (Department of Applied Economics, National University of Kaohsiung)

  • Wei Zhao

    ()

    (Jinhe Center for Economic Research, Xi¡¦an Jiaotong University)

  • Ya -Chin Wang

    ()

    (Department of Finance and Banking, Kun Shan University)

Registered author(s):

    In this paper, we assess the influence of the generalized Nash bargaining model on strategic trade policies. In particular, how the trade policy and the bargaining process over managerial contract are strategically connected within the context of bargaining over the sales delegation model is analyzed. We explore the policy impacts in two different models: the export rivalry model and the import-competing model, and show that the introduction of managers' bargaining process leads to a decrease in the export subsidy and optimal tariff in different models.

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    Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

    Volume (Year): 6 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 38 ()
    Pages: 1-8

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    Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08f10023
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    1. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2008. "Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Differentiated Goods Case," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(6), pages 1-8.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:7:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. David de Meza, 1986. "Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 347-50, May.
    4. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
    5. Mai, Chao-cheng & Hwang, Hong, 1988. "Optimal export subsidies and marginal cost differentials," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 279-282.
    6. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Jansen, Thijs & van Lier, Arie & van Witteloostuijn, Arjen, 2007. "A note on strategic delegation: The market share case," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 531-539, June.
    8. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Sudeshna Bandyopadhyay, 2001. "Efficient bargaining, welfare and strategic export policy," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 133-149.
    9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:6:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Das, Satya P., 1997. "Strategic managerial delegation and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 173-188, August.
    11. Collie, David, 1991. "Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue Tariffs under Oligopoly," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 38(4), pages 398-401, November.
    12. Arjen van Witteloostuijn & Thijs Jansen & Arie van Lier, 2007. "Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games: managerial power, contract disclosure and cartel behavior," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 897-904.
    13. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
    14. Roger Clarke & David R . Collie, 2006. "Optimum-Welfare And Maximum-Revenue Tariffs Under Bertrand Duopoly," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 53(3), pages 398-408, 07.
    15. Ritz, Robert A., 2008. "Strategic incentives for market share," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 586-597, March.
    16. Yasuhiko Nakamura & Kohei Kamaga, 2008. "Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Sequential Move Case," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(7), pages 1-8.
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