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On strategy and the likelihood of success in marital matchmaking under uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Amitrajeet Batabyal

    (Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology)

Abstract

Individuals wishing to get married have made increasing use of matchmakers. This notwithstanding, economists have paid scant attention to the strategies employed by matchmakers and to the likelihood of success arising from the use of these strategies. Consequently, we first specify a “local” and then a “global” strategy for matching male and female clients and then we compute the expected total cost to a matchmaker from the use of these strategies. Next, we calculate the mean number of successes that our matchmaker can hope for. Finally, we provide an upper bound on the probability that the number of matching successes is at least 1+ θ times the mean number, where θ is any positive number.

Suggested Citation

  • Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2004. "On strategy and the likelihood of success in marital matchmaking under uncertainty," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(7), pages 1-7.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04j00001
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 2001. "On the likelihood of finding the right partner in an arranged marriage," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 273-280, May.
    2. Bloch, Francis & Ryder, Harl, 2000. "Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 93-115, February.
    3. van Raalte, Chris & Webers, Harry, 1998. "Spatial competition with intermediated matching," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 477-488, March.
    4. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Hamid Beladi, 2002. "Arranged or love marriage? That is the question," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(13), pages 893-897.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
    • J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets

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