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Les déterminants de l’existence et de l’indépendance managériale des comités de rémunération et de sélection en France

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  • Charles Piot

    () (Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Montpellier)

Abstract

(VF)Cette étude aborde, dans le cadre français, les déterminants de l’existence et de l’indépendance managériale des comités de rémunération et de sélection des administrateurs et mandataires sociaux. Les hypothèses relèvent du cadre théorique de l’agence, dans lequel l’opportunisme managérial justifie la mise en œuvre de mécanismes disciplinaires efficaces. L’échantillon est composé des groupes industriels et commerciaux du SBF 120, sur la période 1999-2001. Les analyses logistiques suggèrent que l’existence des comités de rémunération répond effectivement à une demande d’encadrement de la relation d’agence actionnaires-dirigeants, alors que ce facteur n’a qu’un effet très marginal au niveau des comités de sélection. Par ailleurs, l’actionnariat managérial n’explique pas le fait que ces deux types de comités soient exempts de cadres dirigeants.(VA)This paper investigates the determinants of the existence and managerial independence of remuneration and nominating board committees in the French context. Our hypotheses rely on the agency theory framework, in which managers’ opportunism justifies the im-plementation of effective monitoring devices. The sample comprises non-financial companies of the SBF 120 index, over the 1999-2001 period. Logistic analyses suggest that the existence of remuneration committees results from monitoring needs induced by the shareholder-manager agency relationship, whereas this is far less the case with respect to nominating committees. Furthermore, managers’ ownership does not explain the fact that both types of committee exclude top managers.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Piot, 2006. "Les déterminants de l’existence et de l’indépendance managériale des comités de rémunération et de sélection en France," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 9(2), pages 159-185, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:9:y:2006:i:q2:p:159-185
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    comité de rémunération; comité de sélection; théorie de l’agence; gouvernance; compensation/remuneration committee; nominating committee; agency theory; corporate governance.;

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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