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Légitimité et enracinement du dirigeant par le réseau des administrateurs

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  • Jean-Pierre Pichard-Stamford

    (Université Montesquieu Bordeaux 4)

Abstract

The subject evokes the CEO motivations to develop Board interlocks. Through Boards networks, the CEO is able to grasp information serving the stabilization of the organizational field of the firm and to defend controversial decisions more easily. The paper also describes the CEO's entrenchment within these networks regarding the performance of the firm : any significant influence on performance is detected. The average sample comprises 189 French firms quoted on the Paris stock market between 1988 and 1993.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Pierre Pichard-Stamford, 2000. "Légitimité et enracinement du dirigeant par le réseau des administrateurs," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 3(4), pages 143-178, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:3:y:2000:i:q4:p:143-178
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. narjess BOUABDALLAH & jamel Eddine HENCHIRI, 2020. "L' impact des mécanismes de gouvernance interne sur le risque opérationnel bancaire," Journal of Academic Finance, RED research unit, university of Gabes, Tunisia, vol. 11(1), pages 151-189, June.
    3. Aurélien Eminet & Zied Guedri & Stefan Asseman, 2009. "Le dirigeant est-il l’architecte de sa rémunération? Structure de contrôle du conseil d’administration et mobilisation du capital social," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(3), pages 5-36, September.
    4. Rachel LEVY & Damien TALBOT, 2010. "Control by proximity: evidence from Aerospace Valley competitiveness cluster (In French)," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2010-08, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).

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