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Eficiencia en asignación de cuotas individuales de pesca: teorema de Coase y asimetrías de información

Listed author(s):
  • Eduardo, Saavedra


    (Universidad alberto Hurtado. ILADES)

  • Manuel, Willington


    (Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez. Escuela de Gobierno)

This paper shows that the initial allocation of individual fishing quotas through auctions guarantee economic efficiency. This result is not necessarily true when the assignment is made by historical criteria. The central argument is that the Coase theorem (even in its weak version) is inappropriate when there are information asymmetries, even with zero transaction costs. A direct application of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem states that the initial allocation of these fishing rights does matter, generating a bias in the final allocation favorable to whom has the initial property right. From the public policy point of view, it is essential to ensure an efficient allocation of the initial fishing quotas, which could only be guaranteed with a properly designed auction.

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Article provided by Centro de Estudios Públicos in its journal Estudios Públicos.

Volume (Year): (2012)
Issue (Month): 127 ()
Pages: 54-87

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Handle: RePEc:cpt:journl:v::y:2012:i:127:p:54-87
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  1. Bettis, J. C. & Coles, J. L. & Lemmon, M. L., 2000. "Corporate policies restricting trading by insiders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 191-220, August.
  2. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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