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Capacidad estatal, fiscalidad y subyugación: Panamá entre 1903-1945

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  • Salomón Kalmanovitz

Abstract

Panamá constituye un caso excepcional de construcción de Estado bajo el sometimiento a un imperio que ocupaba su territorio más preciado y ejercía el monopolio de la fuerza. El desarrollo de una capacidad tributaria durante los gobiernos liberales, y mantenida por los regímenes nacionalistas, fue acompanado de movilizaciones populares que le permitieron ganar una creciente autonomía de Estados Unidos. La organización de una policía en los anos cuarenta del siglo XX y la posterior Guardia Nacional le devolvió el monopolio (compartido) del uso de la fuerza. Sin embargo, la fortaleza de su Estado se vio minada por un régimen tributario desigual que afectó poco el excedente económico de la sociedad y por una administración pública politizada, incapaz de recaudar y gastar adecuadamente los recursos públicos.

Suggested Citation

  • Salomón Kalmanovitz, 2015. "Capacidad estatal, fiscalidad y subyugación: Panamá entre 1903-1945," Tiempo y Economía, Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano, vol. 2(1), pages 9-51.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000485:013459
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    File URL: http://revistas.utadeo.edu.co/index.php/TyE/article/view/1004/1073
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1218-1244, September.
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    JEL classification:

    • N16 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • N26 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean

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