IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ces/ifosdt/v57y2004i06p31-37.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Monetary policy in the United States – the Fed in the interest-rate trap?

Author

Listed:
  • Gerhard Illing

Abstract

Since the stock market collapse at the beginning of 2000, the Fed has attempted to stabilise the American economy by providing it with massive liquidity. A major motive was the fear that the American economy could fall into a liquidity trap. Motivated by the conviction that the best strategy is taking timely counter measures, the Fed pursued an aggressive policy of repeated interest rate reductions. The money market interest rate sank to a current 1%, the lowest level in almost 50 years. In the meantime, more and more voices are warning that an over-provision of liquidity by the Fed contributes to an over-valuation of stock-market and real-estate prices. The low interest rates encourage excessive indebtedness and bear the danger that structural imbalances could build up that in future could result in a higher vulnerability to crisis of the American economy. Prof. Gerhard Illing, Munich University, shows in this article that the greatly increased indebtedness of the private sector makes American households more susceptible to fluctuations in interest rates, incomes and real estate prices. It cannot be ruled out that the Fed, instead of facing a liquidity trap, now stands before the reverse problem, an interest rate trap – the danger that faced with growing indebtedness a rise in interest rates could cause seriously negative effects on consumption, which means that the scope for monetary policy will be strongly limited in future.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerhard Illing, 2004. "Monetary policy in the United States – the Fed in the interest-rate trap?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 57(06), pages 31-37, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:57:y:2004:i:06:p:31-37
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/ifosd_2004_6_4.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002. "Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 429-450, December.
    2. Sebastian Barnes & Garry Young, 2003. "The rise in US household debt: assessing its causes and sustainability," Bank of England working papers 206, Bank of England.
    3. Illing, Gerhard, 2004. "Nachfragestimulierung statt Strukturreform – mit gebührenfreiem Rezept aus der deutschen Krise?," Munich Reprints in Economics 13069, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    4. Illing, Gerhard, 2004. "Nachfragestimulierung statt Strukturreform: Mit gebührenfreiem Rezept aus der deutschen Krise?," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 84(3), pages 143-149.
    5. Alexander Al-Haschimi & Margaret M. McConnell & Richard Peach, 2003. "After the refinancing boom: will consumers scale back their spending?," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Dec).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gerhard Illing, 2010. "Monetary and fiscal policy in the economic crisis," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 63(07), pages 10-16, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrew Kish, 2006. "Perspectives on recent trends in consumer debt," Consumer Finance Institute discussion papers 06-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    2. Guy Debelle, 2004. "Household debt and the macroeconomy," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, March.
    3. Guy Debelle, 2004. "Macroeconomic implications of rising household debt," BIS Working Papers 153, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Manuela Goretti, 2005. "The Brazilian currency turmoil of 2002: a nonlinear analysis," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(4), pages 289-306.
    5. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
    6. Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & Roc Armenter, 2007. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 221-234, September.
    7. Silvia Magri & Valentina Michelangeli & Sabrina Pastorelli & Raffaella Pico, 2019. "The expansion of consumer credit in Italy and in the Euro Area: what are the drivers and the risks?," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 500, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    8. Bannier, Christina E., 2003. "Privacy or Publicity - Who Drives the Wheel?," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/29, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    9. Chanelle Duley & Prasanna Gai, 2020. "When the penny doesn't drop - Macroeconomic tail risk and currency crises," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 520, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    10. Camille Cornand, 2006. "Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure: an Experimental Study," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 797-817, November.
    11. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2015. "Macro-expérimentation autour des fonctions des banques centrales," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 3-47.
    12. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2014. "Reducing Overreaction To Central Banks' Disclosures: Theory And Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1087-1126, August.
    13. Helland, Leif & Iachan, Felipe S. & Juelsrud, Ragnar E. & Nenov, Plamen T., 2021. "Information quality and regime change: Evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 538-554.
    14. Kasahara, Tetsuya, 2009. "Coordination failure among multiple lenders and the role and effects of public policy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 183-198, June.
    15. Ahnert, Toni & Martinez-Miera, David, 2021. "Bank Runs, Bank Competition and Opacity," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242348, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. Ursel Baumann, 2014. "Has US Household Deleveraging Ended? A Model-Based Estimate of Equilibrium Debt," Working Papers w201404, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    17. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, April.
    18. Frank Heinemann, 2000. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 316-318, March.
    19. Meng, Xianming & Hoang, Nam T. & Siriwardana, Mahinda, 2013. "The determinants of Australian household debt: A macro level study," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 80-90.
    20. Christina E. Metz, 2002. "Private and Public Information in Self-fulfilling Currency Crises," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 76(1), pages 65-85, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:57:y:2004:i:06:p:31-37. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ifooode.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.