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Les organisations sans but lucratif repondent- elles à une demande de biens de confiance ? Le cas des services de prise en charge

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  • Erwan Quéinnec

Abstract

Contract Failure Theory argues that the Non Distribution Constraint prototypical of Non Profit Organizations (NPOs) plays the role of a safeguard given to buyers of ?trust goods?, the latter of which involving dramatic asymmetrical information. Though stimulating, such a paradigm stumbles over the coexistence of firms and commercial NPOs on markets for care, medical services and education. Therefore, it calls for further discussion in order to study its premises and prescriptions more closely. Focusing on care services, this theoretical examination leads on stressing that (a) trust goods actually give rise to specific problems of asymmetrical information (under conditions), (b) CFT overestimates (underestimates) the ability of Non Distribution Constraint to deal efficiently with such setbacks (the ability of firms to arouse trustworthiness) and (c) CFT is less concerned with ?trust goods? than with ?vulnerable unless monitored consumers? and should strengthen the Non Distribution Constraint with additional signaling devices such as ?disclosure of values?.

Suggested Citation

  • Erwan Quéinnec, 2012. "Les organisations sans but lucratif repondent- elles à une demande de biens de confiance ? Le cas des services de prise en charge," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(1), pages 67-87.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_217_0067
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