Enchères, concurrence par comparaison et collusion
Yardstick competition is an incentive regulatory tool which allows the regulator to introduce virtual competition into monopolistic industries. But as with any competitive environnement, regulated firms may have incentives to collude, thereby undermining the efficiency of the regulation. We study this issue using an infinitely repeated game framework with two symmetric firms. We show that, under the condition that monopoly rights are granted for a sufficiently long period of time, the use of auctions to attribute the markets before regulating them by yardstick competition may make collusion relatively harder to sustain. This result pleads for the use of auctions together with yardstick competition to struggle against collusive behaviours. Classification JEL: D42, D44, L50, L51
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cabral, Luis M. B., 2000. "Introduction to Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262032864, September.
- Tangeras, Thomas P., 2002.
"Collusion-proof yardstick competition,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 231-254, February.
- Tangeras, T.P., 1999. "Collusion-Proof Yardstick Competition," Papers 674, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Tangerås, Thomas P., 1999. "Collusion-Proof Yardstick Competition," Seminar Papers 674, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Eshien Chong & Freddy Huet, 2009. "Yardstick Competition, Franchise Bidding and Firms’ Incentives to Collude," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(1), pages 149-169, September.
- James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "Regulation by Duopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 507-533, Fall.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "Regulation by Duopoly," IDEI Working Papers 20, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Cowan, Simon, 1997. "Competition in the Water Industry," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 83-92, Spring.
- Rothschild, R., 1999. "Cartel stability when costs are heterogeneous," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 717-734, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_573_0583. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.