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Enchères, concurrence par comparaisons et collusion

Author

Listed:
  • Chong Eshien

    (ADIS-GRJM - ADIS-GRJM - UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11)

  • Freddy Huet

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

La concurrence par comparaison permet de créer une pseudo-compétition entre firmes dans des secteurs localement monopolistiques. Cependant, ces dernières peuvent avoir une incitation à la collusion, rendant du même coup cette réglemen-tation inefficace. Nous abordons cette question dans le cadre d'un jeu répété avec deux firmes symétriques. Nous montrons notamment qu'une mise aux enchères des marchés préalable à l'instauration d'une politique de concurrence par comparaison peut contribuer à rendre la collusion instable, à condition que les droits de monopoles soient attribués pendant une période suffisamment longue. Ce résultat plaide pour une utilisation conjointe de ces deux outils comme moyens de lutte contre les pratiques collusives.

Suggested Citation

  • Chong Eshien & Freddy Huet, 2006. "Enchères, concurrence par comparaisons et collusion," Post-Print halshs-00479497, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00479497
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    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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