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Fiscal Rules: Anchors of Stability

Author

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  • Potrafke Niklas

    (ifo Institute, University of Munich, Munich, Germany)

  • Schaltegger Christoph A.

    (University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland)

Abstract

We believe that fiscal rules help to consolidate budgets in the post-Corona period. Fiscal rules reduce fiscal deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios, promote economic growth, mitigate room for fiscal manipulation and encourage politicians to prioritize individual policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Potrafke Niklas & Schaltegger Christoph A., 2022. "Fiscal Rules: Anchors of Stability," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 59-62, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:19:y:2022:i:1:p:59-62:n:12
    DOI: 10.1515/ev-2021-0010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schuknecht,Ludger, 2020. "Public Spending and the Role of the State," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108791700, Enero-Abr.
    2. Potrafke, Niklas, 2020. "General or central government? Empirical evidence on political cycles in budget composition using new data for OECD countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    3. Heinemann, Friedrich & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Yeter, Mustafa, 2018. "Do fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy? A meta-regression-analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 69-92.
    4. Asatryan, Zareh & Castellón, César & Stratmann, Thomas, 2018. "Balanced budget rules and fiscal outcomes: Evidence from historical constitutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 105-119.
    5. Michele Salvi & Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lukas Schmid, 2020. "Fiscal Rules Cause Lower Debt: Evidence from Switzerland’s Federal Debt Containment Rule," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(4), pages 605-642, November.
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