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Effective Tax Rates and Firm Size under Turnover Tax: Evidence from a Natural Experiment on SMEs

Author

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  • Lazar Sebastian

    (“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iasi, 22, Carol I Blv., B Building, Room B 425, 700505, Iasi, Romania)

Abstract

Taking advantage of Romania’s compulsory and unique presumptive tax system (turnover tax) for the smallest of the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which unequivocally allows grouping the companies into two subsamples according to their tax status (the smallest of the SMEs, i.e. micro-companies for tax purposes, subject to alternative turnover tax vs larger SMEs subject to regular profit tax), the papers compute and compare three versions of firm-specific effective tax rates and brings first-time empirical evidence on the effects of turnover taxation on corporate tax burden. The results show not only that in Romania, the turnover tax is now the prevailing tax system, massively displacing the profit tax, but also it is more burdensome in terms of taxes actually paid relative to the firm size. Moreover, turnover taxation means that taxes are due irrespective of the profitability of a company, making the share of companies who paid taxes despite having losses much higher for micro-companies than for larger SMEs, which translates into higher public finance receipts, at the cost of lower tax equity. Since the corporate tax burden triggered by turnover taxation remains under the radar of even the most qualified policy reports, the results offer relevant lessons for other jurisdictions and have valuable policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Lazar Sebastian, 2024. "Effective Tax Rates and Firm Size under Turnover Tax: Evidence from a Natural Experiment on SMEs," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-13.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:econoa:v:18:y:2024:i:1:p:13:n:1025
    DOI: 10.1515/econ-2022-0079
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    effective tax rates; small and medium-sized enterprises; micro-companies; turnover tax;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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