IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Corporate Independent Spending in the Post-BCRA to Pre-Citizens United Era

Listed author(s):
  • Clark Muntean Susan

    (Ball State University)

Registered author(s):

    This paper proposes a theory of political action based upon ownership structure and tests this theory utilizing data on independent expenditures during the campaign finance regulatory regime consisting of the period after the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and before the U.S. Supreme Courts Citizens United decision in 2010. The results suggest a strong relationship between the presence of an entrepreneur or founding family and firm participation in electoral politics via contributions to independent political organizations. Both privately held and publicly traded firms with a principal owner present are more likely to contribute to independent political organizations in the first place, and once they do contribute, give a far greater amount relative to firms without a principal owner. The implications for the post-Citizens United era and possible motivations behind independent expenditures and their impact on other stakeholders including investors, employees, competitors, and the public are discussed. This paper contributes to our understanding of which corporate interests are most likely to spend money on electoral politics independent of the political party or candidate and seeks to broaden discourse about why these actors might participate in elections in the first place as well as the impact of their participation.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bap.2011.13.1/bap.2011.13.1.1348/bap.2011.13.1.1348.xml?format=INT
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Business and Politics.

    Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 1 (April)
    Pages: 1-39

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:13:y:2011:i:1:n:1
    Contact details of provider: Web page: https://www.degruyter.com

    Order Information: Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bap

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as
    in new window


    1. Nyman, Steve & Silberston, Aubrey, 1978. "The Ownership and Control of Industry," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 74-101, March.
    2. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1327, 06.
    3. James J. Heckman, 1976. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 4, pages 475-492 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Ozer, Mine, 2010. "Top management teams and corporate political activity: Do top management teams have influence on corporate political activity?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(11), pages 1196-1201, November.
    5. William S. Schulze & Michael H. Lubatkin & Richard N. Dino & Ann K. Buchholtz, 2001. "Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(2), pages 99-116, April.
    6. Harvey James, 1999. "Owner as Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family Firm," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 41-55.
    7. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    9. Stigler, George J & Friedland, Claire, 1983. "The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 237-268, June.
    10. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
    11. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?," NBER Working Papers 9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    13. Milyo Jeffrey & Primo David & Groseclose Timothy, 2000. "Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-15, April.
    14. Heckman, James J, 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 153-161, January.
    15. Ho, Daniel E. & Imai, Kosuke & King, Gary & Stuart, Elizabeth A., 2007. "Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(03), pages 199-236, June.
    16. Donald B. Rubin, 2005. "Causal Inference Using Potential Outcomes: Design, Modeling, Decisions," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 100, pages 322-331, March.
    17. Bennedsen, Morten & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2000. "The balance of power in closely held corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 113-139.
    18. McKay Amy, 2010. "The Effects of Interest Groups' Ideology on Their PAC and Lobbying Expenditures," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 1-23, August.
    19. Milyo, Jeffrey & Primo, David & Groseclose, Timothy, 2000. "Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(01), pages 75-88, April.
    20. repec:hrv:faseco:30747162 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. McKay, Amy, 2010. "The Effects of Interest Groups' Ideology on Their PAC and Lobbying Expenditures," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(02), pages 1-21, August.
    22. Lord Michael D., 2000. "Constituency-based Lobbying as Corporate Political Strategy: Testing an Agency Theory Perspective," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-21, December.
    23. Anderson, Ronald C & Reeb, David M, 2003. "Founding-Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Leverage," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 653-684, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:13:y:2011:i:1:n:1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.