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Directed Search with Endogenous Capacity

Author

Listed:
  • Godenhielm Mats
  • Kultti Klaus

    (Department of Political and Economic Studies and HECER, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 17, Helsinki 00014, Finland)

Abstract

We study a large economy where capacity-constrained sellers post prices to attract buyers. Capacity is costly and each seller chooses how many units to stock, which allows us to study the relationship between search frictions and capacity. We show that no equilibrium exists with linear costs; however, sufficiently convex costs are enough for existence. There may be several equilibria, but we show that the equilibrium payoffs to the agents are unique as well as constrained efficient. Finally, we numerically analyze how the magnitude of search frictions is affected by the capacity choices of the firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Godenhielm Mats & Kultti Klaus, 2015. "Directed Search with Endogenous Capacity," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 211-249, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:15:y:2015:i:2:p:211-249:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2014-0006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Geromichalos, Athanasios, 2012. "Directed search and optimal production," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2303-2331.
    2. Kultti, Klaus, 1999. "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 106-113, April.
    3. Eeckhout, Jan & Kircher, Philipp, 2010. "Sorting versus screening: Search frictions and competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1354-1385, July.
    4. William B. Hawkins, 2013. "Competitive Search, Efficiency, And Multiworker Firms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(1), pages 219-251, February.
    5. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October.
    6. Philipp Kircher, 2009. "Efficiency of Simultaneous Search," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 861-913, October.
    7. Selcuk, Cemil, 2012. "Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 207-210.
    8. Peters, Michael, 1991. "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1425-1454, September.
    9. Watanabe, Makoto, 2010. "A model of merchants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1865-1889, September.
    10. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
    11. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
    12. Klaus Kultti, 2003. "Comparison of Auctions and Posted Prices in a Finite Random Matching Model," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(3), pages 457-467, September.
    13. Lester, Benjamin, 2010. "Directed search with multi-vacancy firms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2108-2132, November.
    14. Kultti Klaus, 2011. "Sellers Like Clusters," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-28, December.
    15. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 996-1025, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Leo Kaas & Philipp Kircher, 2015. "Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(10), pages 3030-3060, October.
    2. Gomis-Porqueras Pedro & Julien Benoît & Wang Liang, 2018. "Competitive Search with Ex-post Opportunism," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-17, January.
    3. Athanasios Geromichalos, 2015. "Unemployment Insurance and Optimal Taxation in a Search Model of the Labor Market," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 365-380, April.
    4. Klaus Kultti & Tuomas Takalo & Oskari Vähämaa, 2021. "Intermediation in a directed search model," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 456-471, May.
    5. Serene Tan, 2012. "Directed Search And Firm Size," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 95-113, February.
    6. Petrikaite, Vaiva & Hämäläinen, Saara, 2018. "Mobility with private information and privacy suppression," CEPR Discussion Papers 12860, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Makoto WATANABE & José L. Moraga-González, 2023. "Price equilibrium with selling constraints," CIGS Working Paper Series 23-012E, The Canon Institute for Global Studies.
    8. Moraga-González, José-Luis & Watanabe, Makoto, 2020. "Selling Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 14718, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. José L. Moraga-González & Makoto Watanabe & José Luis Moraga Gonzalez, 2023. "Price Equilibrium with Selling Constraints," CESifo Working Paper Series 10583, CESifo.
    10. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2018_020 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Klaus Kultti & Eeva Mauring, 2014. "Low price signals high capacity," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(2), pages 165-181, June.
    12. Klaus Kultti & Tuomas Takalo & Oskari Vähämaa, 2021. "Intermediation in a directed search model," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 456-471, May.

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