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The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality – Core Themes

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  • Pistor Katharina

    (Law School, Columbia University, New York, USA)

Abstract

In this brief introduction, I summarize the core themes of my book “The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality”. Capital, I argue, is coded in law – predominantly in a handful of private law institutions. By relying on legal coding techniques, asset holders invoke the right to enforce claims against others, if necessary with the help of the state’s coercive power.

Suggested Citation

  • Pistor Katharina, 2021. "The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality – Core Themes," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-7, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:11:y:2021:i:1:p:1-7:n:7
    DOI: 10.1515/ael-2020-0102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    2. Ricks, Morgan, 2016. "The Money Problem," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226330327.
    3. Kronman, Anthony T, 1985. "Contract Law and the State of Nature," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 5-32, Spring.
    4. Geoffrey Hodgson, 2009. "On the Institutional Foundations of Law: The Insufficiency of Custom and Private Ordering," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(1), pages 143-166.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephan Puehringer & Matthias Aistleitner & Lukas Cserjan & Sophie Hieselmayr & Jan Weber, 2025. "Idiosyncrasies of the oligarchic elite: On the political economy of wealth concentration in Austria," ICAE Working Papers 157, Johannes Kepler University, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy.
    2. Stephan Pühringer & Matthias Aistleitner & Lukas Cserjan & Sophie Hieselmayr & Jakob Weber, 2024. "Idiosyncrasies of the superrich: On the political economy of wealth concentration in Austria," Working Paper Reihe der AK Wien - Materialien zu Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 254, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capital; private law; the legal profession; global capitalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • P10 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - General
    • P12 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Enterprises
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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