On Network Competition And The Solow Paradox: Evidence From Us Banks
In this paper we develop a model to examine the effect of information technology (IT) in the banking industry. IT can reduce operational cost and create network externality. Empirical studies, however, have shown inconsistency, the so-called Solow paradox, which we explain by stressing the heterogeneity in banking services. In a differentiated model, we characterize the conditions to identify these two effects and explain how the two seemingly positive effects turn negative. Using a panel data set of 68 US banks over 1986-2005, our results show that the profitability effect of IT spending is negative, reflecting a negative network competition effect in the banking industry. Copyright � 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation � 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 76 (2008)
Issue (Month): s1 (09)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (0)161 275 4868
Fax: (0)161 275 4812
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1463-6786
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1463-6786|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:76:y:2008:i:s1:p:37-57. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.