IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jcmkts/v48y2010i4p967-991.html

Open‐Ended Membership Prospect and Commitment Credibility: Explaining the Deadlock in EU–Turkey Accession Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • MEHMET UGUR

Abstract

After the enlargement of 2004, the European Union (EU) has introduced an open‐ended framework for accession negotiations. Although the ultimate aim is still to ensure the integration of candidate countries, the timing and modality of membership is not guaranteed in advance. This article utilizes a political economy model to demonstrate that open‐ended accession negotiations would lead to suboptimal outcomes in the form of inadequate convergence reforms undertaken in the candidate country and poor membership prospect offered by the EU. This analytical finding is compatible with and can be useful in understanding the dynamics of deteriorating reform output in Turkey and weakening EU commitment to Turkish membership since the start of the open‐ended accession negotiations process in 2005. Two necessary conditions must be satisfied to overcome such adverse outcomes in the enlargement process: (i) the EU and the accession country must renew their commitments to reform and integration through a new political bargain; and (ii) they should follow this bargain with periodic summits for co‐ordinating their commitments in the face of shocks to, or emerging deadlocks in, the process of open‐ended accession negotiations.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehmet Ugur, 2010. "Open‐Ended Membership Prospect and Commitment Credibility: Explaining the Deadlock in EU–Turkey Accession Negotiations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 967-991, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:48:y:2010:i:4:p:967-991
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02082.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02082.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02082.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Haverland, Markus, 2000. "National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance of Institutional Veto Points," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 83-103, April.
    2. Harry G. Johnson, 1953. "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 21(2), pages 142-153.
    3. Frank Schimmelfennig & Stefan Engert & Heiko Knobel, 2003. "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 495-518, June.
    4. Ugur, Mehmet & Yankaya, Dilek, 2008. "Policy entrepreneurship, policy opportunism, and EU conditionality: The AKP and TÜSİAD experience in Turkey," Greenwich Papers in Political Economy 3976, University of Greenwich, Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Hüseyin Aytuğ & Merve Mavuş Kütük & Arif Oduncu & Sübidey Togan, 2017. "Twenty Years of the EU-Turkey Customs Union: A Synthetic Control Method Analysis," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 419-431, May.
    3. Bürgin, Alexander, 2013. "Salience, path dependency and the coalition between the European Commission and the Danish Council Presidency: Why the EU opened a visa liberalisation process with Turkey," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 17, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:48:y:2010:i::p:967-991 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Antoaneta Dimitrova, 2007. "Institutionalization of Imported Rules in the European Union's New Member States: Bringing Politics Back in the Research Agenda," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 37, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    3. Felbermayr, Gabriel, 2022. "European trade policy at the service of geopolitics? Requirements for new instruments from the perspective of family businesses," Studien, Stiftung Familienunternehmen / Foundation for Family Businesses, number 273454.
    4. Hideo Konishi & Carsten Kowalczyk & Tomas Sjostrom, 2003. "Free Trade, Customs Unions, and Transfers," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 568, Boston College Department of Economics.
    5. Faruqee, Hamid & Laxton, Douglas & Muir, Dirk & Pesenti, Paolo, 2008. "Would protectionism defuse global imbalances and spur economic activity? A scenario analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 2651-2689, August.
    6. Staiger, Robert W., 1995. "International rules and institutions for trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551, Elsevier.
    7. Tokarick, Stephen, 2006. "A simple rule for assessing tariff and tax incidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 116-120, October.
    8. Vanzetti, David & Kennedy, John O.S., 1989. "Optimal Retaliation in International Commodity Markets," Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 57(01-02-03), pages 1-25, December.
    9. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1984. "Trade warfare: Tariffs and cartels," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3-4), pages 227-242, May.
    10. Roger Clarke & David R. Collie, 2008. "Welfare In The Nash Equilibrium In Export Taxes Under Bertrand Duopoly," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 183-189, April.
    11. Alan V. Deardorff & Indira Rajaraman, 2009. "Buyer Concentration in Markets for Developing Country Exports," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 190-199, May.
    12. Bown, Chad P., 2004. "Trade disputes and the implementation of protection under the GATT: an empirical assessment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 263-294, March.
    13. Cox, W. Michael & Ruffin, Roy J., 1998. "Country-bashing tariffs: Do bilateral trade deficits matter?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 61-72, October.
    14. Carlos Mendez & John Bachtler, 2017. "Financial Compliance in the European Union: A Cross-National Assessment of Financial Correction Patterns and Causes in Cohesion Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 569-592, May.
    15. Nora Dörrenbächer & Ellen Mastenbroek, 2019. "Passing the buck? Analyzing the delegation of discretion after transposition of European Union law," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 70-85, March.
    16. Glebe, Thilo W., 2009. "Enlargement of the European Union: A movement towards the optimal trade bloc size?," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 10(2), pages 1-10.
    17. Eric W. Bond, 2008. "Adjustment Costs and the Sequencing of Trade Liberalisation," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 97-111, January.
    18. Martín Tobal, 2017. "Regulatory Entry Barriers, Rent Shifting and the Home Market Effect," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 76-97, February.
    19. Qerimi, Qerim & Sergi, Bruno S., 2021. "Let's lessen conditionality in times of force majeure events. The archaic righteousness of the policy of conditionality of international Institutions amid COVID-19," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    20. Asrat Tesfayesus, 2016. "Liberalization Agreements in the GATT/WTO and the Terms-of-trade Externality Theory: Evidence from Three Developing Countries," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(5), pages 1000-1022, November.
    21. Opp, Marcus M., 2010. "Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 212-225, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:48:y:2010:i:4:p:967-991. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-9886 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.