A theory of dynamic tariff and quota retaliation
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- Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1993. "A Generalized Theorem of the Maximum," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(1), pages 99-107, January.
- Dana, Rose-Anne & Montrucchio, Luigi, 1986. "Dynamic complexity in duopoly games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 40-56, October.
- Taiji Furusawa, 2004. "Threats and Promises in Tariff Setting," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 635, Econometric Society.
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- repec:ksp:journ1:v:4:y:2017:i:3:p:247-262 is not listed on IDEAS
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KeywordsForeign trade policy; Tariff; Quota; Retaliation; Dynamic Game; Markov perfect equilibrium; Supermodular games;
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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