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Antitrust Economics And Consumer Protection Economics In Policy And Litigation: Why The Disparity?

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  • Lawrence J. White

Abstract

The lag in the use of microeconomics in consumer protection policy and litigation—as compared with the use of microeconomics in antitrust/competition policy and litigation—has at least three causes: a considerably shorter period of intellectual development; the specific historical origins and culture of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), where this disparity is especially noticeable; and the splintering of consumer protection responsibilities across a very large number of federal and state agencies. This paper will expand on these themes and discuss their implications—including the opportunities for expanded research in the area of consumer protection economics. (JEL B12, B13, B21, D18, L41)

Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence J. White, 2020. "Antitrust Economics And Consumer Protection Economics In Policy And Litigation: Why The Disparity?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(4), pages 1555-1564, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:58:y:2020:i:4:p:1555-1564
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12869
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    Cited by:

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    2. Madeira, Carlos, 2021. "The potential impact of financial portability measures on mortgage refinancing: Evidence from Chile," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B12 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Classical (includes Adam Smith)
    • B13 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Wicksellian)
    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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