Do States Free Ride In Antitrust Enforcement?
Recent research has documented a substantial role in antitrust enforcement by U.S. states. While many of the cases litigated involve small local firms, a non-trivial portion encompass multiplestate issues. Some previous literature has investigated whether states engage in free-riding behavior in environmental regulation, and whether governments free ride on private decisions in provision of public goods. In this paper, we analyze a sample of antitrust cases involving crossstate impacts (from the Multi-State Antitrust Database, provided by the National Association of Attorneys General) and explain the determinants of free-riding (which we define as participatingin a case, but not as a lead plaintiff). JEL classification:
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Volume (Year): 51 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Robert Feinberg & Kara Reynolds, 2010. "The Determinants of State-Level Antitrust Activity," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 37(3), pages 179-196, November.
- Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2009.
"International Antitrust Enforcement and Multi-Market Contact,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2599, CESifo Group Munich.
- Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2012. "International Antitrust Enforcement And Multimarket Contact," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 635-658, 05.
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