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Antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general: institutional, legal and political considerations

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  • Dove John A.

    (Center for Political Economy, 137N Bibb Graves Hall, Troy University, Troy, AL 36082, USA)

Abstract

Since deregulation in 1980, there has been a major shift in antitrust enforcement to the states, specifically to state attorneys general (AGs). For advocates of deregulation, this move has had important unintended consequences. Specifically, it has allowed antitrust litigation to become hitched to the political incentives of AGs. Analysis of a panel dataset of all state antitrust actions between 1990 and 2008 suggests that antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general appears to follow electoral cycles, which is especially pronounced depending on specific institutional constraints that exist between the states.

Suggested Citation

  • Dove John A., 2014. "Antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general: institutional, legal and political considerations," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-22, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:16:y:2014:i:2:p:22:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/bap-2013-0032
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Colin Provost, 2003. "State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 33(2), pages 37-53, Spring.
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    4. Colin Provost, 2010. "When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and Policy Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 40(4), pages 597-616, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2024. "State-Level Antitrust Enforcement: Revisiting the Determinants," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(3), pages 793-806, November.

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