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Designing the optimal public pension system

Author

Listed:
  • Takao Fujii
  • Fumiaki Hayashi
  • Jun Iritani
  • Kazumasa Oguro

Abstract

This paper uses a two-period overlapping generations model in order to provide a theoretical design for an optimal public pension system based on a partial equilibrium analysis. Household preferences only depend on two periods consumption and leisure and is homogeneous of degree m with respect to consumption in the working and retired periods. We present characteristic features of an optimal public pension system in this paper. First, differences in the population growth rate do not affect the relative level of the optimal net lifetime burden rate of each generation. Second, if m≠0 or m
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Suggested Citation

  • Takao Fujii & Fumiaki Hayashi & Jun Iritani & Kazumasa Oguro, 2017. "Designing the optimal public pension system," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 3-26, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ausecp:v:56:y:2017:i:1:p:3-26
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-8454.12077
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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