IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Capital Accumulation, Welfare, and the Emergence of Pension-Fund Activism

  • Pascal Belan
  • Philippe Michel
  • Bertrand Wigniolle

This paper presents an overlapping-generations model with altruistic consumers, in which pension funds, by holding a significant share of capital assets, produce noncompetitive behavior. We study the consequences of such behavior for capital accumulation and welfare in the long run when subsidies are associated with contributions to pension funds. If bequests are operative and the subsidy rate is not too high, the capital stock increases with the introduction of pension funds, and this increases long-run utility. If bequests are not operative without pension funds, the rise in long-run welfare is no longer guaranteed, even if the subsidy rate is low.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.

Volume (Year): 63 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 54-82

in new window

Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200703)63:1_54:cawate_2.0.tx_2-v
Contact details of provider: Web page:

Order Information: Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Brunner, Johann K., 1993. "Transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully-funded pension system: The case of differing individuals and intragenerational fairness," Discussion Papers, Series I 266, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
  2. Barro, Robert J., 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Scholarly Articles 3451399, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Mark G. Guzman, 1999. "Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a simple macroeconomic model," Working Papers 9907, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  4. Nicola Cetorelli & Pietro F. Peretto, 2000. "Oligopoly banking and capital accumulation," Working Paper Series WP-00-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  5. Emmanuel Thibault, 2000. "Existence of equilibrium in an OLG model with production and altruistic preferences," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 709-715.
  6. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 64, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  7. Pascal Belan & Pierre Pestieau, 1999. "Privatizing Social Security: A Critical Assessment," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 24(1), pages 114-130, January.
  8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2002:i:1:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Gabszewicz, J.J. & Michel, P., . "Oligopoly equilibrium in exchange economies," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1265, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. BELAN, P. & MICHEL, Ph. & WIGNIOLLE, B., 2001. "Pension funds and capital accumulation," CORE Discussion Papers 2001026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. John Laitner, 1982. "Monopoly and Long-Run Capital Accumulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 143-157, Spring.
  12. Breyer, Friedrich & Straub, Martin, 1993. "Welfare effects of unfunded pension systems when labor supply is endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 77-91, January.
  13. Brunner, Johann K., 1993. "Redistribution and the efficiency of the pay-as-you-go pension system," Discussion Papers, Series I 265, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
  14. Belan, Pascal & Michel, Philippe & Wigniolle, Bertrand, 2003. "Les effets à long terme des fonds de pension," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 79(4), pages 457-480, Décembre.
  15. Homburg, Stefan, 2014. "The Efficiency of Unfunded Pension Schemes," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-523, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  16. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June.
  17. Codognato, Giulio & Gabszewicz, Jean J, 1993. "Cournot-Walras Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 453-64, July.
  18. Burkart, Mike & Gromb, Denis & Panunzi, Fausto, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728, August.
  19. Pascal Belan & Philippe Michel & Pierre Pestieau, 1998. "Pareto-Improving Social Security Reform," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(2), pages 119-125, December.
  20. Steven Huddart, 1993. "The Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(11), pages 1407-1421, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200703)63:1_54:cawate_2.0.tx_2-v. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.