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Privatisation des systèmes de retraite : une évaluation critique

Author

Listed:
  • Belan, Pascal

    (Laboratoire de macroéconomie, CREST)

  • Pestieau, Pierre

    (CREPP, Université de Liège)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical evaluation of theoretical models showing that shifting from pay-as-you-go to fully-funded social security schemes can be made Pareto-improving. Further, it argues that what often makes a reform towards funded schemes attractive is a number of additional features that could also have been introduced in the unfunded social security system. The paper is organized in three main sections. The first one presents a taxonomy of social security systems; this allows us to show that in privatization programs the issue is not just moving from unfunded to funded mechanisms but also, and above all, to individualize the system in such a way that there is no more redistribution. The second shows that funded and pay-as-you-go schemes are equivalent as long as the payroll taxes paid during the period of inception of the pay-as-you-go scheme are duly invested. Finally, the third section presents two models of Pareto improving social security reforms and discusses the assumptions on which they rely. L’objectif de cet article est de contribuer à la clarté du débat entrepris dans de nombreux pays sur la réforme du système de retraite. Cette réforme est souvent présentée comme se limitant à un changement de technique de financement : on passerait de la répartition à la capitalisation. Or, il apparaît que capitalisation et répartition sont sous certaines hypothèses équivalentes et que les réformes proposées ne se limitent pas à passer de l’une à l’autre. Si seule changeait la technique de financement, il n’est généralement pas possible que la réforme soit Pareto-améliorante. Par exemple, toute réduction de l’endettement global — dette publique plus droits à la pension — favoriserait les générations futures mais pénaliserait toute, ou en tout cas une partie de la génération de transition. Il existe bien des modèles de réforme qui illustrent ce point de vue et prétendent accroître le bien-être de tous. Nous en présentons deux. Dans le premier, l’introduction de la capitalisation s’accompagne d’une réduction des distorsions liées aux cotisations sociales; dans le second, elle s’accompagne d’une subvention à l’épargne qui dans un contexte de croissance endogène a une productivité constante. Il apparaît que les gains de bien-être qu’entraînent ces réformes ne sont pas très importants; de plus ils ne sont pas liés à la privatisation comme telle; ils pourraient en effet être réalisés dans le cadre des systèmes actuels.

Suggested Citation

  • Belan, Pascal & Pestieau, Pierre, 1999. "Privatisation des systèmes de retraite : une évaluation critique," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 9-27, mars-juin.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:75:y:1999:i:1:p:9-27
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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