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Capital accumulation, welfare and the emergence of pension fund activism

  • Pascal Belan

    ()

    (LEN - Laboratoire d'Economie de Nantes - UN - Université de Nantes)

  • Philippe Michel

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille 3 - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bertrand Wigniolle

    ()

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)

This paper presents an overlapping generations model with altruistic consumers, in which pension funds, by holding a signi...cant share of capital assets, produce non competitive behavior. We study the consequences of such behavior on capital accumulation and welfare in the long run when subsidies are associated with contributions to pension funds. If bequests are operative and the subsidy rate is not too high, the capital stock increases with the introduction of pension funds, and this increases long run utility. If bequests are not operative without pension funds, the rise in long-run welfare is no longer guaranteed, even if the subsidy rate is low.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00268847.

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Date of creation: Mar 2007
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Publication status: Published in FinanzArchiv Public Finance Analysis, 2007, 23 (2), pp.54-82. <10.1628/001522107X186728>
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00268847
DOI: 10.1628/001522107X186728
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00268847
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  1. Steven Huddart, 1993. "The Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(11), pages 1407-1421, November.
  2. Homburg, Stefan, 2014. "The Efficiency of Unfunded Pension Schemes," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-523, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  3. Pascal Belan & Philippe Michel & Pierre Pestieau, 1998. "Pareto-Improving Social Security Reform," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(2), pages 119-125, December.
  4. BELAN, Pascal & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Privatizing social security: A critical assessment," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1407, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Mark G. Guzman, 2000. "Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a simple macroeconomic model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(2), pages 421-455.
  6. Cetorelli, Nicola & Peretto, Pietro F., 2000. "Oligopoly Banking and Capital Accumulation," Working Papers 00-19, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  7. Gabszewicz, J.J. & Michel, P., . "Oligopoly equilibrium in exchange economies," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1265, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Emmanuel Thibault, 2000. "Existence of equilibrium in an OLG model with production and altruistic preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(3), pages 709-715.
  9. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Scholarly Articles 3606237, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Barro, Robert J., 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Scholarly Articles 3451399, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
  12. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2002:i:1:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Brunner, Johann K., 1996. "Transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded pension system: The case of differing individuals and intragenerational fairness," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 131-146, April.
  14. CODOGNATO, Giulio & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J., . "Cournot-Walras equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. BELAN, P. & MICHEL, Ph. & WIGNIOLLE, B., 2001. "Pension funds and capital accumulation," CORE Discussion Papers 2001026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. Breyer, Friedrich & Straub, Martin, 1993. "Welfare effects of unfunded pension systems when labor supply is endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 77-91, January.
  17. Belan, Pascal & Michel, Philippe & Wigniolle, Bertrand, 2003. "Les effets à long terme des fonds de pension," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 79(4), pages 457-480, Décembre.
  18. John Laitner, 1982. "Monopoly and Long-Run Capital Accumulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 143-157, Spring.
  19. Brunner, Johann K., 1993. "Redistribution and the efficiency of the pay-as-you-go pension system," Discussion Papers, Series I 265, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
  20. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728.
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