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The Principle of Cost-Based Supervision in Practice

Author

Listed:
  • Luis Dumlao

    (Ateneo de Manila University)

Abstract

A key response of financial regulators around the world to the financial and economic crises of ten years ago has been the formation of supervisory committees. Such committees now exist in several countries worldwide. Consequently, many regulators fund their supervisory function by charging their supervisees. The objective of this paper is to compare how these regulators charge fees, identify common practices, draw conclusion from observations, and provide relevant recommendations. This paper especially focuses on the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England that charge fees just enough to recover the cost of supervisory function, or those that follow what this paper refers to as the “principle of cost-based supervision.” A discussion on how selected examples of regulators practice the principle of cost-based supervision follows. Simulations of fees using selected procedures to supervisees in the Czech Republic and Greece follow. Then this paper introduces the asset elasticity of cost notated as n and simulates the hypothetical supervisory fee if n is constant.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Dumlao, 2024. "The Principle of Cost-Based Supervision in Practice," International Journal of Economic Sciences, European Research Center, vol. 13(2), pages 1-19, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:aop:jijoes:v:13:y:2024:i:2:p:1-19
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas M. Eisenbach & Andrew F. Haughwout & Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner & David O. Lucca & Matthew Plosser, 2017. "Supervising large, complex financial institutions: what do supervisors do?," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue 23-1, pages 57-77.
    2. David Aikman & Jonathan Bridges & Anil Kashyap & Caspar Siegert, 2019. "Would Macroprudential Regulation Have Prevented the Last Crisis?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 107-130, Winter.
    3. Daniel K. Tarullo, 2019. "Financial Regulation: Still Unsettled a Decade after the Crisis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 61-80, Winter.
    4. S. Carbó-Valverde & H.A. Benink & T. Berglund & C. Wihlborg, 2015. "Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis in Europe: Recent Developments (2010–2013)," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: James R Barth & George G Kaufman (ed.), The First Great Financial Crisis of the 21st Century A Retrospective, chapter 7, pages 167-218, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other

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