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A Game Theory Approach to Railroad-Shipper Negotiations

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  • Huneke, William

Abstract

Game theory provides a framework for analyzing problems when there are a small group of participants. This is unlike the economic model of perfect competition, which requires several participants. Game theory began as a way to analyze parlor card games, but has developed into a rigorous analytical technique for evaluating strategic interactions. These interactions could be between hostile countries, competing companies, or between a shipper and railroad. In fact, game theory provides a useful structure for analyzing the interactions between a shipper and a railroad. This paper models such interactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Huneke, William, 2006. "A Game Theory Approach to Railroad-Shipper Negotiations," Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, Transportation Research Forum, vol. 45(1).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:ndjtrf:206781
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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/206781
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 232-262, Summer.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    4. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-150, June.
    5. Nicolas Curien & Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, 1998. "Pricing Regulation Under Bypass Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 259-279, Summer.
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    Keywords

    Industrial Organization;

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