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Federal Nutritional Guidance and the Politics of Science: A Tale of Regulatory Capture

Author

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  • Hobbs, Bradley K.
  • Wenzel, Nikolai G.

Abstract

This paper examines US government involvement in nutrition and agriculture. Specifically, it attempts to explain the existence of conflicting information presented by scientific versus government sources in the food pyramid. We start by examining the theory of the politicization of science and regulatory capture. We then examine federal nutrition advice through this theoretical framework. The paper concludes that the negative consequences of federal intervention for everyday Americans call for an alternative approach of decentralization, with an emphasis on private regulators, with government sticking to its core functions, rather than engaging in politicized favoritism.

Suggested Citation

  • Hobbs, Bradley K. & Wenzel, Nikolai G., 2020. "Federal Nutritional Guidance and the Politics of Science: A Tale of Regulatory Capture," International Journal on Food System Dynamics, International Center for Management, Communication, and Research, vol. 11(05), December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ijofsd:346636
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.346636
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    References listed on IDEAS

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