The TRIPS Disagreement: Should GATT Traditions Have Been Abandoned?
The world standards for patents and copyrights established by the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) have been controversial from their inception. This article establishes parallels between cooperative increases in the duration of intellectual property protection and cooperative reductions in tariff protection. Whereas a countryÂ’s tariffs lead to unintended harm to other countries, its intellectual property protection generates unintended benefits. The long-established GATT principle of trade liberalization has traditionally achieved mutual gains for countries of all types through symmetric tariff rate cuts that result in different final rates. By contrast, the TRIPS agreement created the likelihood of losses for developing countries by requiring asymmetric increases in patents and copyrights to establish common worldwide standards. The technical annex to this paper formalizes the analysis with a simple model of Â“North-SouthÂ” patent protection. Sample calculations suggest a decline in the net benefits from innovation in developing countries in the order of 40 percent.
Volume (Year): 01 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Suite 820, 410 22nd Street East, Saskatoon SK, S7K 5T6|
Phone: (306) 244-4800
Fax: (306) 244-7839
Web page: http://www.esteycentre.com/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- M. Scott Taylor, 1993. "TRIPS, Trade, and Technology Transfer," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(3), pages 625-637, August.
- Markusen, James R., 2001.
"Contracts, intellectual property rights, and multinational investment in developing countries,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 189-204, February.
- James R. Markusen, 1998. "Contracts, Intellectual Property Rights, and Multinational Investment in Developing Countries," NBER Working Papers 6448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- R. Stephen Richardson & James D. Gaisford, 1996. "North-South Disputes over the Protection of Intellectual Property," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(s1), pages 376-381, April.
- Helpman, Elhanan, 1993.
"Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1247-1280, November.
- Helpman, E., 1992. "Innovation, Imitation and intellectual Property Rights," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1597, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 4081, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gilbert, R. & Shapiro, C., 1988.
"Optimal Patent Length And Breadth,"
28, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Diwan, Ishac & Rodrik, Dani, 1991.
"Patents, appropriate technology, and North-South trade,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 27-47, February.
- Diwan, Ishac & Rodrik, Dani, 1989. "Patents, appropriate technology, and North-South trade," Policy Research Working Paper Series 251, The World Bank.
- Ishac Diwan & Dani Rodrik, 1989. "Patents, Appropriate Technology, and North-South Trade," NBER Working Papers 2974, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul Klemperer, 1990.
"How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 113-130, Spring.
- Klemperer, Paul, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," CEPR Discussion Papers 392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Deardorff, Alan V, 1992. "Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(233), pages 35-51, February.
- Subramanian, Arvind, 1991. "The international economics of intellectual property right protection: A welfare-theoretic trade policy analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 945-956, August.
- Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, 1990. "Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 131-146, Spring.
- Johnson, William R, 1985. "The Economics of Copying," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(1), pages 158-174, February.
- Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, 1991. "An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 3-27, Winter.
- Maskus, Keith E. & Penubarti, Mohan, 1995. "How trade-related are intellectual property rights?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 227-248, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:ecjilt:23839. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.