Ambient-Based Policy Instruments: The Role of Recommendations and Presentation
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- Spraggon, John & J. Oxoby, Robert, 2010. "Ambient-Based Policy Instruments: The Role of Recommendations and Presentation," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(02), pages 262-274, April.
References listed on IDEAS
- Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 1998. "A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 297-323, November.
- Francisco Alpízar & Till Requate & Albert Schram, 2004. "Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(2), pages 231-252, October.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hamet SARR & Mohamed Ali BCHIR & François COCHARD & Anne ROZAN, 2016. "Nonpoint source pollution: An experimental investigation of the Average Pigouvian Tax," Working Papers 2016-05, CRESE.
- Messer, Kent D. & Murphy, James J., 2010.
"FOREWORD: Special Issue on Experimental Methods in Environmental, Natural Resource, and Agricultural Economics,"
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review,
Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 39(2), April.
- Kent D. Messer & James J. Murphy, 2010. "Foreword: Special Issue on Experimental Methods in Environmental, Natural Resource and Agricultural Economics," Working Papers 2010-03, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
- Hamet Sarr & Mohamed Bchir & Francois Cochard & Anne Rozan, 2016. "Nonpoint source pollution: An experimental investigation of the Average Pigouvian Tax," Working Papers hal-01375078, HAL.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata, 2013. "Empowering neighbors versus imposing regulations: An experimental analysis of pollution reduction schemes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 469-484.
- François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.
More about this item
Keywordsambient pollution instruments; recommended play; experiments; Environmental Economics and Policy;
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