Explaining Variations In Share Contracts: Land Quality, Population Pressure And Technological Change
Substantial variations in landowner's share under sharecropping arrangements are documented. Partial relationships between landowner's share and land quality and between landowner's share and physiological population density are explained by extensions of the competitive theory of share tenancy. It is shown that high landowner's share can be expected to be associated with high land quality and or high physiological density. The tendency for increases in population to be associated with increases in landlords' shares can be ameliorated by land-saving technological change.
Volume (Year): 23 (1979)
Issue (Month): 02 (August)
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- Reid, Joseph D, Jr, 1976. " Sharecropping and Agricultural Uncertainty," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 549-576, April.
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- Roumasset, James, 1978. "The new institutional economics and agricultural organization," MPRA Paper 13175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Leonid Hurwicz & Leonard Shapiro, 1978. "Incentive Structures Maximizing Residual Gain under Incomplete Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 180-191, Spring.