IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ags/agreko/267536.html

Farm Worker Legislation: Interest Groups And Developments

Author

Listed:
  • Goedecke, E. J.
  • Ortmann, G. F.

Abstract

The Laboria Minute of September 1990 resulted in an agreement that legislation on labour relations cannot work unless there has been extensive consultation with at least the major parties in the labour relations arena. Interest groups involved in the agricultural labour relations framework are identified using the tools of public choice theory. Resulting legislation reflects the relative political weight of these interest groups within the existing institutional structure. A change in this structure will result in a different weighting of the various groups along with new legislation reflecting the most politically powerful interests. An update on what has transpired in the agricultural labour relations arena is given along with policy implications and conclusions.

Suggested Citation

  • Goedecke, E. J. & Ortmann, G. F., 1992. "Farm Worker Legislation: Interest Groups And Developments," Agrekon, Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), vol. 31(4), December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:agreko:267536
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.267536
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/267536/files/agrekon-31-04-010.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/267536/files/agrekon-31-04-010.pdf?subformat=pdfa
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.267536?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David G. Abler, 1989. "Vote Trading on Farm Legislation in the U.S. House," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 71(3), pages 583-591.
    2. Martin, William J., 1990. "Public Choice Theory And Australian Agricultural Policy Reform," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 34(3), pages 203-203, December.
    3. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    4. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    5. Paarlberg, Robert, "undated". "THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY: Three Approaches," 1989 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 2, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 270661, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
    7. George J. Stigler, 1974. "Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 359-365, Autumn.
    8. Robert Paarlberg, 1989. "The Political Economy of American Agricultural Policy: Three Approaches," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 71(5), pages 1157-1164.
    9. James D. Shaffer, 1979. "Observations on the Political Economics of Regulations," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 61(4_Part_2), pages 721-731.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mara Faccio & Luigi Zingales, 2022. "Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(4), pages 1983-2018.
    2. Robert Tollison, 2012. "The economic theory of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 73-82, July.
    3. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Методологический Анализ Теории Опекаемых Благ: Научный Доклад [methodological analysis of the Theory of Patronized Goods. Research report]," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2014:1, Institute of Economics.
    4. Harold Mulherin, J., 2007. "Measuring the costs and benefits of regulation: Conceptual issues in securities markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 421-437, June.
    5. Brooks, Jonathan, 1995. "Policies and institutions in transition economies: a political economy perspective on the agri-food sector," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 487-500, December.
    6. Luc Laeven, 2004. "The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 26(3), pages 201-224, December.
    7. Gawel, Erik & Lehmann, Paul & Strunz, Sebastian & Heuson, Clemens, 2018. "Public Choice barriers to efficient climate adaptation – theoretical insights and lessons learned from German flood disasters," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 473-499, June.
    8. Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2024. "Lobbying and liquidity requirements: Large versus small banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    9. Cornett, Marcia Millon & Davidson, Wallace III & Rangan, Nanda, 1996. "Deregulation in investment banking: Industry concentration following Rule 415," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 85-113, January.
    10. Christoph Kaserer, 2006. "Trends in der Bankenaufsicht als Motor der Überregulierung des Bankensektors – Anmerkungen aus einer politökonomischen Perspektive," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(1), pages 67-87, February.
    11. Gawel, Erik & Heuson, Clemens & Lehmann, Paul, 2012. "Efficient public adaptation to climate change: An investigation of drivers and barriers from a Public Choice perspective," UFZ Discussion Papers 14/2012, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
    12. Van Long, Ngo, 2013. "The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 161-181.
    13. Luzi Hail & Ahmed Tahoun & Clare Wang, 2018. "Corporate Scandals and Regulation," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 56(2), pages 617-671, May.
    14. Darcy W E Allen, 2020. "When Entrepreneurs Meet:The Collective Governance of New Ideas," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number q0269.
    15. Hong, Yun & Yao, Youfu, 2024. "Can comment letters impact excess perks? Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    16. Jonathan Brooks, 1996. "Agricultural Policies In Oecd Countries: What Can We Learn From Political Economy Models?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1‐4), pages 366-389, January.
    17. Jorge García García & David Camilo L�pez & Enrique Montes Uribe, 2016. "Los costos de comerciar en Colombia: aproximación basada en una comparación de precios," Coyuntura Económica, Fedesarrollo, vol. 46(2), pages 75-139.
    18. Douglas M. Walker & Peter T. Calcagno, 2013. "Casinos and political corruption in the United States: a Granger causality analysis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(34), pages 4781-4795, December.
    19. Knobel, A., 2011. "Inter-industry Import Tariff Differences in Russia," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 11, pages 64-84.
    20. Tanger, Shaun M. & Laband, David N., 2009. "An empirical analysis of bill co-sponsorship in the U.S. Senate: The Tree Act of 2007," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 260-265, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:agreko:267536. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeasaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.