Trends in der Bankenaufsicht als Motor der Überregulierung des Bankensektors - Anmerkungen aus einer politökonomischen Perspektive
In this article it is argued that overregulation in the German banking industry is driven by deficient incentives. One important piece in this picture is the rule that resources used by the supervision authority are financed, basically, through an industry tax. Overregulation arises in such a context because the social cost of regulation is neither internalised by the supervision authority nor by the government. The natural antagonism of the industry against too much regulation is attenuated because of a highly unequal impact of the regulation cost on different industry groups. In line with this picture we present evidence in favour of the hypothesis that international harmonisation in banking regulation evolved as a means of overregulation. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2006
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Volume (Year): 7 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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- Schaefer, Stephen M., 1990. "The regulation of banks and securities firms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 587-597, May.
- Eckert, Ross D, 1981. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 113-20, April.
- Sam Peltzman, 1976.
"Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,"
NBER Working Papers
0133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1437-1467.
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