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A Review of Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast's Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History

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  • Robert Bates

Abstract

In Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History , Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast probe the organizational foundations of development. Outlining the properties of the "natural" and "open entry" societies, they highlight as well the conditions under which societies can move from one to the other, thereby achieving political order and economic prosperity.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Bates, 2010. "A Review of Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast's Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 752-756, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:48:y:2010:i:3:p:752-56
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.48.3.752
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Besley, Timothy & Kudamatsu, Masayuki, 2007. "Making autocracy work," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3764, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Humphreys, Macartan & Bates, Robert, 2005. "Political Institutions and Economic Policies: Lessons from Africa," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 403-428, July.
    3. Block, Steven A., 2002. "Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the case of Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 205-228, February.
    4. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Keefer, Philip, 2013. "Organizing for prosperity : collective action, political parties and the political economy of development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6583, The World Bank.
    2. Olivier Bomsel, 2018. "Mineral rents and social orders: when Radetzki meets Douglass North," Mineral Economics, Springer;Raw Materials Group (RMG);Luleå University of Technology, vol. 31(1), pages 7-11, May.
    3. Evelyn Dietsche, 2017. "Political economy and governance," WIDER Working Paper Series 024, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    4. Mirza Hassan, 2013. "Political settlement dynamics in a limited-access order: The case of Bangladesh," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-023-13, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    5. Bluhm, Richard & Szirmai, Adam, 2012. "Institutions and long-run growth performance: An analytic literature review of the institutional determinants of economic growth," MERIT Working Papers 2012-033, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    6. Hartmann, Simon, 2012. "The conceptual flaws of the new EU development agenda from a political economy perspective, or why change is problematic for a donor-driven development policy," Working Papers 35, Austrian Foundation for Development Research (ÖFSE).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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