IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cid/wpfacu/107.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Institutions and Development

Author

Listed:
  • Robert H. Bates
  • Avner Greif
  • Macatan Humphreys
  • Smita Singh

Abstract

This paper addresses the political foundations for economic development in Africa and does so by exploring two basic themes: political accountability and political order. We say that political elites are accountable when, in order to retain office, they must employ power to serve the interests of those whom they rule. By political order we mean the extent to which people employ coercion to protect property rights rather than to trespass upon them. Where there is accountability, many hold, then those with power make policies that enhance the welfare of private citizens, as by rendering them more prosperous (e.g. World Bank 1991). And where there is political order, then there is security for property rights, rendering it in the interests of private agents to invest, to labor, and to generate higher levels of income (North and Thomas 1973). The paper provides data about the trajectory of political reform and political order in contemporary Africa and their significance for the behavior of governments. It demonstrates the limited impact of political reform upon public policy, documents the relationship between reform and conflict, and posits the existence of a political "trap" that limits Africa’s development.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert H. Bates & Avner Greif & Macatan Humphreys & Smita Singh, 2004. "Institutions and Development," CID Working Papers 107, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cid:wpfacu:107
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/faculty-working-papers/107.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
    2. Usher, Dan, 1989. "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1031-1044, December.
    3. Benno J. Ndulu & Stephen A. O'Connell, 1999. "Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 41-66, Summer.
    4. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    5. Muthoo, Abhinay, 2000. "On the foundations of basic property rights, Part I: A model of the state-of-nature with two players," Economics Discussion Papers 9986, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    6. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
    7. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 563-573, October.
    8. World Bank, 2003. "World Development Indicators 2003," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13920, December.
    9. Bates, Robert & Ferree, Karen & Robinson, A & Singh, Smita & Wren, Anne, 1996. "Toward The Systematic Study Of Transition," Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) Papers 294051, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government.
    10. Block, Steven A., 2002. "Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the case of Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 205-228, February.
    11. Fearon, James D. & Laitin, David D., 1996. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 715-735, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bates, Robert H., 2006. "Institutions and Development," Scholarly Articles 37093808, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    2. Robert Bates & Avner Greif & Smita Singh, 2002. "Organizing Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(5), pages 599-628, October.
    3. Robert H. Bates, 2004. "Probing the Sources of Political Order," CID Working Papers 110, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    4. Robert H. Bates, 2005. "Political Insecurity and State Failure in Contemporary Africa," CID Working Papers 115, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    5. Vergne, Clémence, 2009. "Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 63-77, March.
    6. Eoin F. McGuirk & Nathaniel Hilger & Nicholas Miller, 2023. "No Kin in the Game: Moral Hazard and War in the US Congress," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2370-2401.
    7. Humphreys, Macartan & Bates, Robert, 2005. "Political Institutions and Economic Policies: Lessons from Africa," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 403-428, July.
    8. Ethan Bueno De Mesquita & Catherine Hafer, 2008. "Public Protection Or Private Extortion?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 1-32, March.
    9. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2010. "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 3-57, March.
    10. Stergios Skaperdas, 2003. "Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 135-162, July.
    11. Martinez, Leonardo, 2009. "A theory of political cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1166-1186, May.
    12. David K Levine & Salvatore Modica & Aldo Rustichini, 2023. "Cooperating Through Leaders," Levine's Working Paper Archive 11694000000000112, David K. Levine.
    13. Camille Laville, 2018. "The econometrical causal analysis of internal conflicts: The evolutions of a growing literature [L’analyse économétrique des conflits internes par l’approche causale : les évolutions d’une littérat," Working Papers hal-01940461, HAL.
    14. Kausik Chaudhuri & Sugato Dasgupta, 2005. "The political determinants of central governments' economic policies in India: an empirical investigation," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(7), pages 957-978.
    15. Abhinay Muthoo, 2000. "On the Foundations of Basic Property Rights, Part I: A Model of the State-of-Nature with Two Players," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0471, Econometric Society.
    16. Michael Dorsch & Karl Dunz & Paul Maarek, 2015. "Macro shocks and costly political action in non-democracies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 381-404, March.
    17. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.
    18. Paul Maarek & Michael Dorsch & Karl Dunz, 2012. "Macro Shocks, Regulatory Quality and Costly Political Action," THEMA Working Papers 2012-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    19. Camille Laville, 2018. "The econometrical causal analysis of internal conflicts: The evolutions of a growing literature [L’analyse économétrique des conflits internes par l’approche causale : les évolutions d’une littérat," CERDI Working papers hal-01940461, HAL.
    20. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cid:wpfacu:107. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chuck McKenney (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ciharus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.